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SUMMARY 
 
 
This paper charts the evolution of financial and economic crisis in the global 
economy and argues that the likely outcome will be sustained growth in the 
two very large Asian Driver economies of China and India and stagnation in 
the historically dominant northern economies. Given the nature of demand in 
low income southern economies, it is likely to be reflected in sustained 
demand for commodities, with other southern economy producers in global 
value chains being forced into lower levels of value added. Standards are 
likely to be of considerably reduced significance in value chains feeding into 
China and India. These issues are considered in the light of evidence drawn 
from the experience of Thai exporters of cassava, and Gabonese exporters of 
timber. 
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1. BUYERS, MARKETS AND GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
 
Until the late 1950s, economic growth was largely explained by the quantum 
of available labour, land and the investment, and growth was assumed to 
occur at the extensive margin. High savings-investment rates were at the 
centre of the Harrod-Domar family of growth models which informed 
development policy in the immediate post-war period. However, the 
“discovery” by Solow in the 1950s that an increase in the volume of productive 
inputs accounted for only around 87.5 percent of economic growth in the US 
increasingly shifted the focus of attention in growth models from the extensive 
to the intensive margin (Solow, 1957). The improvement in the quality of 
productive inputs has thus risen to central stage.  
 
Both the emphasis on the extensive and the intensive margin reflect a 
preoccupation in growth theory and development policy with factors 
determining the augmentation of supply. However, in recent years, we have 
become increasingly aware of the role which demand plays in economic 
growth, and its derived impact on the growth of supply capabilities.  
 
A key demand-related factor affecting economic growth is the size and rate of 
market growth. Rapidly expanding and large markets both spur productivity 
growth by allowing for scale economies in production (Verdoorns Law) and 
send a signal to producers that they can have confidence in investing for the 
future. It leads to a virtuous circle of growth and innovation, and is particularly 
influential in the context of very large domestic markets, or when producers 
sell into global markets. 
 
But, it is not just the volume and rate of demand growth which affects 
productivity and capabilities. The nature of demand also has a significant 
impact on capabilities, and the returns to alternative patterns of production. 
Around the late 1960s, there was an important transition in final markets in the 
northern economies (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Once post World War Two 
reconstruction had been achieved and basic needs of most consumers had 
been met, consumers became increasingly discerning about the products they 
consumed. They demanded higher levels of quality, much greater product 
differentiation and faster rates of product innovation. In the context of this 
change in the pattern of demand, the ideal archetype in production 
organisation moved from mass production to mass customisation (Pine, 
1993), in which producers developed the capabilities to meet different critical 
success factors (CSFs) in proliferating and dynamic market segments. Variety 
and flexibility – with little trade-off in costs – became the name of the game in 
competitive production. 
 
A direct consequence of this search for low-cost flexibility was a transition in 
production organisation, from “just-in-case” mass-production to “just-in-time” 
lean production (Kaplinsky, 1994; Womack and Jones, 1996). A series of 
related changes in quality-procedures (with “zero-defects” becoming an 
essential building block of just-in-time production) and reduced batch-size, 
coupled with the drive by firms to concentrate on their core competences 
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meant that lead firms were required to take responsibility for the systemic 
efficiency of their increasingly global value chains (GVCs) (Gereffi, 1994). 
One important component of the tool-box which this entailed was the 
development of standards in production, often usefully summarised as QCD. 
The Q stood for standards over quality (increasingly measured in parts per 
million), the C for cost (annual reductions in price paid to suppliers) and D for 
delivery (more frequent deliveries in smaller batches).  
 
Most of these standards were firm-specific. But in some cases industry-
specific standards were also developed as the outcome of collaboration 
between private sector firms searching for competitive advantage. 
Increasingly, too, standards were introduced to foster the capabilities of 
suppliers to meet the new requirements of lean production, notably the cross-
sectoral ISO9000 quality procedures, and subsequently ISO14000 
environmental standards. The development and extension of these process 
standards began in the Japanese auto industry in the 1960s and then 
gradually spread to the global electronics sector and then more widely and 
rapidly to many sectors in subsequent decades. By the end of the twentieth 
century, these private sector standards had become an integral component in 
most GVCs feeding production into global markets, particularly for 
intermediate and final consumption goods characterised by variety.  
 
A further development of standards reflected a different process, one in which 
the key drivers were final consumers and the state concerned with consumer 
welfare, rather than private sector firms searching for competitive advantage. 
In some cases, standards were set by governments to promote product 
safety, particularly in the food sector. But, increasingly, consumers’ 
organisations became concerned with the processes involved in producing 
products to meet their needs, requiring fair returns to producers (FairTrade) 
and organic certification.  
 
Figure 1 summarises the growing complexity of these standards, covering 
both product and process, and involving various types of codification including 
both private and public sectors. 
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Figure 1: Drivers of Standards Over Process and Product 
 By Firms  By Governments By Civil Society 
 
Product Quality standards such as permitted parts per million 
defects 
Food hygiene standards 
 
Lead content in toys 
Organic products 
 
 
 
Process 
Quality control 
procedures – such as 
ISO9000 
 
Frequency of on-time 
delivery 
Hygiene standards – such 
as Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point 
conformance (HACCP) 
 
Traceability of pesticide 
content 
Sustainability standards – such 
as FSC (Forest Stewardship 
Council) (timber) 
 
Child labour standards 
 
 
How have the producers inserted in GVCs been informed about the growing 
prevalence and the nature of these evolving standards? Where the supply 
function has been internalised within a diversified firm, it has been the firm 
which has driven the standards through its subsidiaries. And to the extent that 
the large firm has focused on the systemic efficiency of its value chain (as, for 
example, in the Japanese auto industry during the 1980s, Cusumano, 1985), 
it has driven standards to its suppliers through supply chain management 
procedures, usually informing suppliers of the standards they are required to 
achieve, and in some cases also assisting them to achieve these standards 
(Bessant, Kaplinsky and Lamming, 2003). But in a growing number of GVCs, 
suppliers have often been left to make their own way in identifying the core 
relevant standards, and in establishing the procedures required to meet these 
standards. It is in these sectors that global buyers have come to play an 
important role (Box 1). By defining the role played by individual parties in the 
chain, the buyers can also block the upgrading paths of producers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1. The Role of Global Buyers 
 
In many sectors not involving the direct ownership of suppliers, global 
buyers perform a number of key functions: 
 
• They channel producers into different market segments, which have 
different requirements and provide different potential for sustainable 
profitability 
 
• They signal to producers what customers in these market segments 
want (the critical success factors in these markets), and how this is 
changing 
 
• They help producers to identify the capabilities required to satisfy 
these consumer demands 
 
• In some cases, they actively assist producers to upgrade 
 
• They assist in the location and in the acquisition of key inputs 
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If we relate these functions performed by global buyers to the challenge of 
capability-building, the story becomes a little more complicated. In order to 
understand these complexities we need to decompose what we mean by the 
“upgrading” implicit in the concept of “capabilities”. Arising out of the GVC 
approach is an augmentation of the understanding in the innovation literature 
which has historically been predominantly focused on process-upgrading, with 
an ancillary focus on product-upgrading. The GVC framework, recognising the 
centrality of dynamic rents to the global fragmentation and relocation of 
economic activity (Kaplinsky, 2005) distinguishes four types of upgrading 
activity (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). The first two are familiar to the 
innovation literature – upgrading of process and product. The third is central 
to the GVC approach, referring to the upgrading of function. That is, firms may 
change their positioning in the chain, perhaps moving from physical 
transformation to design or marketing. Often, as in Figure 2, there is a 
hierarchy in this process of upgrading as firms move from assembly, to 
manufacturing-transformation, to design and to branding (or often a 
combination of these functions). In mature chains, when firms have developed 
capabilities, they may also upgrade by moving to a new chain. 
 
Figure 2: Is There a Hierarchy of Upgrading? 
 Process 
Upgrading 
Product  
Upgrading 
Functional  
Upgrading 
Chain  
Upgrading 
 
Trajectory 
 
 
 
Examples Original 
equipment 
assembly (OEA) 
 
 
Original 
equipment 
manufacture 
OEM 
 
 
 
Original 
design 
manufacture 
 
 
 
 
 
Original 
brand 
manufacture 
 
 
 
Moving chains 
– e.g. from 
black and 
white TV 
tubes to 
computer 
monitors 
Degree of 
disembodied 
activities 
Disembodied content of value added increases progressively 
 
 
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001. 
 
The reason why these categories of upgrading are important is that the 
buyers, who have a key role to play in informing suppliers of market 
requirements, have their own interests to protect and will generally limit the 
upgrading path of their suppliers. Buyers naturally are focused on protecting 
their own rents in the chain and will therefore “guide” and often limit through 
contractual conditions, the upgrading path of suppliers. The nature of these 
constraints on upgrading will depend on the particular competences of the 
buyers. For example, in the global furniture value chain large global buyers 
such as IKEA will allow, and indeed foster, process upgrading by their 
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suppliers which reduces cost. But, at the same time, they will zealously guard 
the design and branding functions and keep these functions off-limits to 
suppliers (Kaplinsky, Morris and Readman, 2002). The more variety and 
brand-conscious markets are, the more likely that lead chain buyers will strive 
to maintain their control over design and branding. 
 
Of course, the understanding of capability-growth must reflect both supply and 
demand factors. But it also will reflect the interaction between these two sets 
of factors. For example, responding to a series of analyses on the growth of 
supply capabilities in the newly-industrialising-economies, Feenstra and 
Hamilton point to the role played by the US retail sector in the evolving east 
Asian “export miracle”. They show how the growing concentration of buying 
power in the US during the 1960s led to intense competition to find low-cost 
high-volume sources of supply (Feenstra and Hamilton, 2005). This led 
Walmart and other large retail chains to actively foster the growth of supply 
capabilities in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan during the 1970s 
and 1980s, a process extended to Chinese and other global suppliers in the 
1980s and 1990s. This doved-in with the simultaneous investment in the 
supply of capabilities by governments and producers in these NIEs (Wade, 
1990; Amsden, 1989) 
 
In summary, therefore, although economic growth is ultimately a story of 
augmented supply capabilities, there has been growing recognition of the key 
role which final markets play in inducing this growth in supply capabilities. 
Market size and market growth are one part of this story. But another part 
involves the nature of final markets, and the role which this plays in guiding 
the direction of capability growth amongst suppliers. Intermediation into final 
markets, and therefore the nature of buying power in global markets, is a 
further factor affecting economic growth, particularly in economies in which 
external trade plays a key role. 
 
In this paper we consider the extent to which changing demand profiles might 
affect the nature and organisation of global value chains. In the context of the 
current global economic crisis, we explore the implications of the transition in 
final market from stagnant high income economies to dynamic low income 
economies in general, and China in particular. We focus on the degree of 
value added in these chains and the nature of standards incorporated in 
process and product though an analysis on two chains in the soft-
commodities sector – cassava in Thailand and timber in Gabon. Both cases 
have seen a reorientation of their external markets from the North (in this case 
the EU) to the South (in this case China). In both cases, as we shall see, this 
change in final market has implications for the building of dynamic capabilities 
and in the degree of value addition in low income markets. 
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2. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE SOUTHERN DRIVERS OF 
DEMAND GROWTH 
  
The recession following the financial crisis of autumn 2008 sparked the 
largest fall in output in the north since WW2, with an associated decline in 
output and exports in many low income economies, including the stellar-
growth economies in east and south Asia. Between the onset of the crisis and 
the first quarter of 2009, global output fell by 2.4 percent, and that in the 
OECD fell by four percent (Holland et al, 2009). The unknown issue (at the 
point of writing, December 2009), is how this crisis will unfold and whether 
and how it will be resolved. 
 
Essentially two major schools of analysis and policy response dominate the 
public debate on the evolution and resolution of the crisis. (Krugman 
amusingly refers to these schools in the US context as comprising of 
“saltwater” economists on the east and west coasts, and the “freshwater“ 
economists in Chicago and other interior universities - Krugman, 2009). On 
the one hand, the “saltwater” Keynesians who have dominated policy 
responses argue that a necessary transitionary mechanism is government 
financing to sustain demand growth and prevent a downward spiral of 
confidence and economic activity. On the other hand, the “freshwater” 
mainstream economists are suspicious of big government, and fearful that 
deficit-financing will induce inflation, and argue for a very rapid rebalancing of 
government budgets. 
 
What is missing from this polarised debate is a structural analysis of the crisis, 
and it is this which we need to understand in order to assess the likely role 
played by China and other large southern economies in the coming decade 
and beyond. Before presenting this structural analysis, it is helpful to think 
through a number of possible outcomes to the current financial and economic 
crisis (Box 2). The first outcome is the “V Scenario” – a rapid downturn 
followed by a fairly rapid upturn. At the time of writing in late 2009, growth is 
beginning to revive in the US and parts of Europe, as well as in China and 
elsewhere in Asia, and this is the positive (or rather, the “least negative” 
hoped-for outcome). The “U Scenario” (sometimes described as the “bath 
Scenario” when the upturn is delayed) suggests a similar outcome, but with a 
more protracted dip. Less comfortable is the W scenario – a double dip 
growth path, but with a subsequent revival to past growth trajectories. This is 
an outcome considered more realistic by some, such as the CEO of the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Bank. The most pessimistic outcome to the financial 
crisis is that it will follow the same path as that experienced by the Japanese 
after its financial bubble burst in the early 1990s, that is a sharp downturn 
followed by a protracted period of stagnation. This is the “L Scenario”. 
Somewhere between the L and the W Scenarios is “square root Scenario” 
( ), that is a sharp downturn, followed by a small rise (consistent with the 
revival of activity in late 2009), followed by a period of protracted stagnation. A 
recent study supports this likely outcome, - “we expect growth to resume by 
the end of [2009] in most countries, [but] the level of output in the OECD will 
remain permanently lower.” (Holland et al, 2009: 9).  
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It is important, however, to avoid treating the global economy as an 
homogeneous entity and recognise the possibility – we believe likelihood – of 
diverse regional outcomes. The structural analysis which follows contrasts the 
likely outcome in the northern economies (Section 2.1) with that in two key 
southern economies, the Asian Driver economies of China and India (Section 
2.2). 
2.1. Structural Crisis in the North 
High rates of global economic growth during the 1990s and the first decade of 
the new century were essentially fuelled by high rates of consumption in key 
northern economies, particularly in the large economies of the US, the UK and 
Spain, as well as in some smaller economies such as Ireland, Greece and 
Iceland. In each of these cases, this consumption boom was made possible 
through a series of financial bubbles, particularly in housing which allowed 
consumers to drawn on the “wealth” arising from inflating house prices. This 
resulted in two sets of related phenomena – falling rates of household and 
personal savings (in some cases falling into dis-savings) and a rise in balance 
of payments deficits. These deficits in external payments were filled by large 
payments’ surpluses in key exporting economies, particularly China, Japan 
and Germany, made possible by restrained personal consumption arising 
from high rates of personal (and in recent years, corporate) savings and/or 
low rates of consumption.  
Box 2. How will the Economic Crisis Unfold? 
A number of different scenarios can be identified as the economic crisis 
unfolds 
The V Scenario 
After a sharp and rapid contraction, growth revives to the pre-crisis growth 
path 
The U Scenario 
In structure, much like the V Scenario in the sense that growth revives to 
previous levels, but after some delay  
 
The W Scenario 
This is a double-dip crisis, involving a sharp fall, a rapid rise, followed by a 
subsequent fall and than a rapid rise to a revival of the pre-crisis growth path  
 
“Is this a V recovery or a W? I think it’s the latter “ (CEO HSBC Bank, Financial 
Times, 5th Oct 09) 
 
The L Scenario 
A sharp contraction, followed by a long period of stagnation, much like that 
experienced in Japan after the bursting of its financial bubble in the early 
1990s 
The  Scenario  
A sharp contraction, followed by a minor revival and subsequent protracted 
stagnation 
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Table 1 shows the extent of external payments deficits and surpluses in key 
large trading economies. The two most notable cases are the largest deficit 
economy, the US (its payments deficit hovered around five percent of GDP) 
and China (whose payments surplus in 2008 was 11 percent of GDP). Also 
notable is the case of Spain (deficit of almost 10 percent of GDP in 2008) and 
the UK (a deficit almost three percent of GDP). Some of the other smaller 
OECD economies showed even greater trade deficits, notably Greece (15 
percent of GDP) and Iceland (40 percent of GDP in 2008). A significant 
feature of this performance was the growth in these structural imbalances 
during the 2000s. Table 2 shows the disparities in savings and consumption 
rates which underpinned these structural trade imbalances. The striking 
characteristics of this data are, first, the relatively low rates of final household 
consumption expenditure in China and, second, the high rate of private 
consumption (especially compared to low rate of savings) in three key bubble 
economies, Spain, the UK and the US. Concomitant with these imbalances 
has been the growth of foreign exchange reserves in the two leading surplus 
economies (China and Japan), which together accounted for nearly half of 
total global foreign exchange reserves (Table 3). 
 
Table 1: Country Current Account Balance (Percent of Country GDP) 
 Brazil India China Germany Japan Spain UK USA 
1985 -0.1 -1.8 -3.7 2.5 3.8 1.6 0.7 -3.0 
1990 -0.8 -2.2 3.4 2.8 1.5 -3.5 -3.9 -1.4 
2000 -3.8 -1.0 1.7 -1.7 2.6 -4.0 -2.7 -4.3 
2005 1.6 -1.0 7.2 5.1 3.6 -7.4 -2.6 -5.9 
2008 -1.7 -1.0 11.0 6.7 3.2 -9.6 -2.8 -4.7 
Source: Calculated from OECD Database, accessed November 2009 
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Table 2: Savings and Household Consumption Expenditure  
(Percent of Country GDP) 
 
Gross Domestic 
Savings 
Household Final 
consumption expenditure 
Savings to 
Consumption Ratio 
Brazil 
1990 21 59 0.36 
2000 16 64 0.26 
2008 19 61 0.31 
China 
1990 40 46 0.86 
2000 38 47 0.80 
2008 49 37 1.34 
India 
1990 23 66 0.35 
2000 23 64 0.36 
2008 33 56 0.59 
Germany 
1990 23 58 0.40 
2000 22 59 0.38 
2007 25 57 0.45 
Japan 
1990 34 53 0.65 
2000 27 56 0.48 
2006 25 57 0.44 
Spain 
1990 23 60 0.38 
2000 23 60 0.39 
2007 25 57 0.44 
United Kingdom 
1990 18 62 0.29 
2000 16 65 0.25 
2007 15 63 0.24 
United States 
1990 16 67 0.24 
2000 17 69 0.24 
2006 14 70 0.20 
Source: Complied from World Development Indicators accessed November 
2009. 
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Table 3: Foreign Exchange Reserves (US$ Millions) 2009 
 Country ($ Millions) 
% of World 
Total 
 World (sum of all countries) 7,520,566  
2009 China (including Hong Kong) 2,292,300 30% 
2009 Japan 1,044,327 14% 
2008 
Eurozone (EU member states which 
have adopted the EURO, incl. ECB) 569,213 8% 
2008 India 313,354 4% 
2009 Brazil 223,713 3% 
2008 Germany 150,377 2% 
2008 United Kingdom 99,956 1% 
2008 United States 67,000 1% 
Source: The SWF Institute, accessed November 2009 (www.swfinstitute.org) 
The imbalances in trade – feeding off the financial bubble – represents a core 
structural feature which is unsustainable in the medium and long term, 
particularly for very large global economies such as the US and China. To be 
resolved they require either (or a combination of) a reduction in consumption 
in the surplus economies, or a rise in consumption in the deficit economies, 
resulting in a fall in net exports in surplus economies and a rise in net exports 
in the deficit countries. These changes may work their way through the 
system through changes in exchange rates, personal consumption 
expenditure and government expenditure, and may or may not involve price 
deflation or inflation. The precise mechanisms involved in the resolution of the 
imbalances are less important for our discussion than the level of output and 
output growth in which the structural rebalancing will be achieved. 
 
Some changes are already occurring. Thus household savings rates are 
beginning to rise, with consumption falling and trade deficits narrowing in key 
deficit economies. At the same time, payments surpluses have been falling in 
some economies, including China (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Changes in Trade and Savings for Major Economies  
(2008-2009). 
 
Current Account 
Balance 
(Percent of GDP) 
Gross National 
Savings 
(Percent of GDP) 
Trade 
(% Change in $ value June 
2008/09 YOY) 
 2008 20091 2008 20091 Imports Exports 
Germany 6.4 2.9 26 20 33 34 
Japan 3.2 1.9 27 23 26 24 
United 
Kingdom -1.7 -2.0 15 12 31 31 
United States -4.9 -2.6 13 11 24 -0.29 
Source: Calculated from IMF World Economic Outlook and DOTS Database, 
accessed November 2009 
1: Estimated by the IMF WEO. 
 
However, the outcome of falling consumption in most northern economies has 
been a sharp rise in unemployment almost everywhere, with aggregate 
employment in the OECD falling by 2.2m between the 2nd quarters of 2008 
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and 2009 (Holland, et al, 2009), and unemployment growing to exceed 10 
percent of the labour force in the US in late 2009. It has also led to a sharp fall 
in exports in major surplus economies (Table 4). In June 2009 Germany’s 
exports had declined by 34 percent and Japan’s by 24 percent compared to 
the same period in the previous year. China, too, saw a fall in employment 
after global trade fell significantly in the first year after the financial melt-down 
(13 percent fall in exports between June 08/09) 
 
This decrease in output in the north, and increase in unemployment - both 
arising out of falling personal consumption - have been met by a massive 
“saltwater Keynesian” injection of funds through bank-bailouts and 
quantitative easing in most of the deficit economies, fuelling a “freshwater” 
response warning of the dangers of inflation. Although not historically 
unprecedented, government debt as a share of GDP has risen sharply in 
almost all economies as actual (and projected) fiscal deficits have grown 
(Table 5). Without this growth in government expenditure, there is little doubt 
that the already almost unprecedentedly large fall in output and rise in 
unemployment would have been substantially greater. As a result, there has 
been some revival in economic activity, with both the US and the EU moving 
out of recession (in the sense that output stopped falling) in the final quarter of 
2009 and a revival of China’s exports. Virtually no observer doubts the 
reflationary consequences of government deficit-financing – the debate is on 
the sustainability and long-term consequence of this deficit spending 
programme and the extent of the economic revival. 
 
Table 5: General Government Fiscal Balance (Percent of GDP) 
Country Germany Japan Spain 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
1980 -3 -5 -2 -3 -3 
1990 -2 2 -4 -2 -4 
2000 1 -8 -1 1 2 
2005 -3 -5 1 -3 -3 
2008 0 -6 -4 -5 -6 
2009 -4 -10 -12 -12 -12 
2010 -5 -10 -12 -13 -10 
2011 -4 -8  -11 -8 
2012 -2 -8  -9 -6 
2013 -1 -8  -8 -7 
2014 0 -8  -7 -7 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, accessed November 2009. 
Shaded area are estimates 
We are thus faced with two clear trends in major northern economies. First, 
personal consumption has fallen back and is unlikely to rise in the near-to-
mid-term as households rebuild their savings and cut personal debt. Second, 
continued government dis-saving has limited the fall in aggregate 
consumption and output, but it is unsustainable in the medium and long-term, 
both for fiscal reasons and because of sustained trade deficits. So, the issue 
is in what other ways can the structural deficits in key northern economies be 
resolved if the past growth trajectory is to be sustained, that is if any of the V, 
U or W Scenarios are to be achieved. One possibility is for there to be a rapid 
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growth in consumption and imports in China, Japan, Germany and other 
economies in trade surplus. Here the portents are not positive. Scarred by its 
history of inflation during the 1920s, Germany has made it clear that it wishes 
to minimise deficit financing. It has also explicitly committed itself to remaining 
an economy with a substantial trade surplus. Japan, despite efforts to reflate 
consumption in the past, also does not suggest itself as an economy capable 
of pulling-in significant imports from the deficit economies, and allowing them 
to benefit from rapid export-led growth. As a recent IMF Report concluded, 
“the scope for advanced economies such as Germany and Japan to 
contribute to rebalancing is limited, given their need to build savings to 
prepare for population ageing” (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2009:33). So 
China, and to a lesser extent India, hold the hopes of sustaining the V, U or W 
Scenarios. 
 
The problem is that there is little realistic sign that China-led reflation will draw 
in the imports to allow the major deficit economies to resume past levels of 
consumption growth whilst at the same time rebalancing their external 
payments accounts. It is true that the Chinese government has embarked on 
a major spending programme. But, much of this has focused on infrastructure 
and on public services where, in 2009, government spending expanded 
rapidly in health (38 percent), education (24 percent), and social safety (22 
percent) this year (Source: World Bank China Quarterly Review March 2009). 
These infrastructural expenditures do have derived import requirements but, 
as we will see below, these are unlikely to have a direct first-round impact on 
the exports of the US and the EU. 
 
Of course there are indirect trade mutlipliers operating in both these forms of 
domestically-oriented expenditure in China, but they are likely to be small in 
nature, at least insofar as they affect the demand for goods and services 
exported by high income northern economies1. Moreover, employment-growth 
in China has been key in sustaining political stability in the face of rising 
inequality, and insofar as China’s labour-intensive exports decline, the 
emphasis will necessarily be placed on promoting domestic production to 
meet rising consumer demand. In addition, despite China’s rapid economic 
growth and large size, it remains a small player in international trade. In 2008, 
total Chinese demand was equivalent to less than one-quarter of total 
consumption in the US and the EU. All of these factors also apply to India, but 
since its global footprint is smaller than that of China, its capacity to stimulate 
exports from the northern economies is even more limited. 
 
From this we conclude that beyond the short term unsustainable deficit 
financing by governments in the large deficit economies, in reality the 
rebalancing by these economies will occur through a reduction in 
consumption, and hence in imports. We should not see this as an historical 
aberration. Rather, it was the post 1990s boom in consumption in the large 
                                            
1
  There will, of course be a positive second round general equilibrium impact on high 
income country exports to those countries whose exports to meet China’s 
infrastructure investments are expanding. But these indirect impacts are likely to be 
delayed and, moreover, increasingly low income countries imports are being sourced 
from China and India rather than the EU and the US. 
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deficit economies which was aberrant, arising from a series of financial 
bubbles and leading to growing consumption in the (high income) deficit 
economies being subsidised by high savings in some (low income) surplus 
economies (notably China and India). We can also anticipate that this fall in 
northern consumption will persist for some time, perhaps even as long as the 
18 year post-bubble recession which the Japanese economy has experienced 
since 1991. Thus, the real issue is whether these northern economies will 
experience an L or a  scenario, that is whether output grows, but below 
pre-crisis levels before it stabilises and stagnates.  
 
2.2. Sustained Consumption in the South 
China’s recent growth, at least since the beginning of the 1980s, has been 
stellar, averaging more than nine percent p.a over the period. India, too, has 
experienced very rapid and sustained growth, albeit only from the early 
1990s. it is tempting to see these growth trajectories as exceptional, an 
“economic miracle”. Yet neither of these two country’s growth experiences are 
unique. If we chart the evolution of their growth paths – both in relation to 
output and exports – since the onset of their growth-inflection, and compare 
these with the similar experiences of Japan (after 1960) and Korea (after 
1963), it is evident that other economies have experienced similar economic 
“miracles” in the past (Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008). What is significant 
about the China-India experience is the size of these economies. Together, 
Japan and Korea never exceeded five percent of the global population. In 
2008 China alone accounted for 20 percent of the global population and 
together with India, for almost 37 percent of the global total. (It is partly for this 
reason that they are increasingly referred to as the “Asian Drivers” – 
www.asiandrivers.open.ac.uk). 
 
Three key relevant features stand out with regard to the recent growth 
experience of these two Asian Driver economies. The first is that their growth 
rates have been significantly greater than those of the key northern 
economies. If these past trajectories are sustained, then it is estimated that 
China will be the second largest economy by 2016 and India the third largest 
by 2035 (Goldman Sachs 2001). Of course, if past growth relativities are not 
sustained in the future (for example, if as suggested in Section 2.1 above the 
northern economies experience a protracted period of stagnation), then China 
and India’s relative size will grow in a shorter time span than these projections 
of past performance suggest. Second, both China and India are in substantial 
trade surplus. They do not need to reduce or hold back consumption in the 
same way as do the large northern economies. And, third, by virtue of their 
large size, they have the capacity to grow and realise scale economies by 
expanding their very large domestic markets. An illustration of the size of 
these Asian Driver markets is provided by a recent analysis of the locus of 
consumption by the global consuming class (“the Middle Class”), defined as 
those consumers with annual incomes of between $10 and $100 per day in 
2009 (in 2005 PPP $) (Kharas, 2009). Projecting forward to 2030 on the basis 
of growth rates in the past two decades, the centre of gravity of global 
consumption shifts decisively (Table 6). The share of Europe and US falls 
from 64 percent in 2009 to 30 percent in 2030, whilst that of the south in 
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general and Asia in particular, rises. The share of Asia and the Pacific in the 
global consuming class is projected to increase from 23 percent in 2009 to 59 
percent in 2030. Bear in mind, though, that these projections are based on 
past growth relativities. If northern economies do stagnate and the Asian 
Drivers and the surrounding regional economy continues to grow (albeit at a 
reduced rate), the shift of global consumption power to Asia, and to low 
income economies in Asia, will be accentuated. 
 
Table 6: Spending by the Global Middle (Percent of Global GDP in $PPP) 
(2009 to 2030) 
 
2009 2030 
N. America 26 10 
Europe 38 20 
C. and S. America 7 6 
Asia Pacific 23 59 
SSA 1 1 
M. East, N. Africa 4 4 
Source: Selected from Table 3, Kharas (2009). 
Nothing guarantees sustained growth in the Asian Driver economies. The fall 
in consumption in the northern deficit economies may be so large that it 
undermines export-oriented growth in China and India, with a potential 
combination of negative multiplier effects on economic activity and political 
disruption as unemployment grows. It may also be that environmental 
externalities grow so substantially, exacerbated by changing and 
unpredictable climate, that output growth is not sustainable. And it may be 
that global political instability spills over into the Asia-Pacific region, with a 
harmful impact on economic growth. So, as in the case of the analysis of likely 
growth paths in the northern economies (Section 2.1), there are clear 
uncertainties in projecting forward, particularly in the context of a disruptive 
global financial crisis. Nevertheless it is our judgement that just as growth is 
likely to be reduced or to stagnate in the northern economies in the future, so 
growth in Asia in general, and in China and India in particular, is likely to be 
sustained. If nothing else, the relativities in growth paths between these two 
worlds in the past two decades is likely to be sustained, and even to increase. 
If this is the case, then it is important to understand the nature of demand in 
these two large southern drivers of growth, an issue which we now consider. 
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3. PATTERNS OF DEMAND IN SOUTHERN DRIVERS OF 
GROWTH 
 
Despite differences in country-size and endowments, there are well-
established paths of development through which most economies pass 
(Kuznets, 1966; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975). Low income economies tend to 
be agrarian, with the primary sector dominating GDP. As incomes rise and 
manufacturing expands, the industrial sector takes over as the major driver of 
GDP growth. Continued income growth leads to higher demand for services, 
and at higher income levels it becomes the dominant contributor to GDP. 
These structural shift represent a well established pattern, observed in a large 
number of countries over time. What interests us in this analysis is that in the 
context of China (and India) becoming the major driver(s) of global demand in 
the coming decades, what implications the structural shifts in these Asian 
Driver economies have for low income country exporters in general, and for 
low income country exporters of commodities in particular? Here there are two 
major issues – the structure, and the nature of import demand – and in both 
cases we will consider them in relation to the evolution of the Chinese 
economy. 
3.1. The Structure of Import Demand  
There are three major consequences of changing economic structures which 
affect the product composition of imports. First, at low per capita incomes, the 
income elasticity of demand for agricultural products in general (and food in 
particular) is relatively high. As incomes rise, the relative income elasticity of 
demand for manufactures grows, and as incomes increase further, the 
demand for services becomes increasingly important in final demand. 
Secondly, with the changing sectoral distribution of GDP, there is a shift in 
labour and employment across sectors. As the industrial sector expands, 
labour and employment migrate from agriculture in the rural areas to the 
manufacturing sector in the cities. Third, as economic output becomes more 
diversified specialisation and interchange grows. Together with the growth of 
urbanisation, this requires heavy investments in infrastructure.  
 
These three trends result in a growing demand for commodities. “Soft 
commodities” feed agricultural inputs into food, and provide intermediate 
inputs (such as cotton and timber) into manufacturing. The demand for “hard 
commodities” (such as minerals and metals) and energy grows as a 
consequence of investments in infrastructure and the expansion of the 
manufacturing sector.  
 
China’s (and India’s) growth-paths reflect each of these trends. Significantly, it 
reflects the experience of an economy at an early stage in the evolution of this 
growth-paths. We can illustrate this by focusing on some of the key 
parameters of China’s recent growth trajectory (see, also, Farooki, 2009). 
China’s economy has shown a rapid transition from agriculture to industry. 
The share of agriculture in GDP fell from 27 percent in 1990 to 11.3 percent in 
2008. In the same period, the share of industry increased from 42 percent to 
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49 percent of GDP. This was accompanied by large scale rural-urban 
migration. In 2007 45 percent of the population (594m) lived in urban centres. 
By 2015 the urban population is projected to rise to 684m, and to 890m in 
2030. This growth in urban population between 2007 and 2030 will exceed the 
total combined population of the US and Europe.  
 
This process of urbanisation is reflected in the growth in demand for 
infrastructure in general, and new infrastructure and housing in particular. It is 
one of the reasons leading observers to conclude that infrastructure-intensity 
is highest at the early stages of industrialisation ant at relatively low levels of 
per capita income (Canning, 1999; Auty, 2008). New projects tend to be much 
more commodity intensive as compared to expansion and reconstruction 
investments (World Bank, 2009). As Table 7 shows, the share of new projects 
in urban fixed investment increased from less than a third to almost a half 
between 1995 and 2007.  
 
Table 7: Percent Share of Total Investment in Fixed Assets in Urban 
Areas by Type of Construction in China (1995-2007) 
Year New Construction Expansion Reconstruction Maintenance and Equipment 
1995 30 29 12 29 
2000 32 24 15 29 
2007 44 17 12 27 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2008 
Second, the growth of China’s manufacturing sector has also made intensive 
use of commodities, particularly hard commodities and energy. To a 
considerable extent this is reflected in the metals and minerals-intensity of 
China’s rapidly-growing manufactured exports which comprised the bulk of 
exports between 1990 and 2006 (Figure 3).  
 
As a result of these combined factors, the elasticity of demand for energy and 
metals grew rapidly between the 1990s and the 2000s, and for key resource 
inputs such as coal, pig iron, crude steel and rolled steel, comfortably exceed 
a value of one (Table 8). That is, for example, every one percent increase in 
GDP saw a more than two percent increase in the demand for rolled steel. 
 
Table 8: Elasticity’s of Energy Consumption and Metal Production in 
China (1991-2005) 
Period Coal Crude Oil Pig Iron Crude 
Steel 
Rolled 
Steel 
1991-1995 0.441 0.569 0.900 0.614 0.958 
2001-2005 1.105 0.832 2.222 2.340 2.545 
Source: Selected from Zhang and Zheng (2008) 
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Figure 3: China’s Metal and Minerals Intensive Exports in Total 
Manufactures Exports (1990-2006). 
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Source: Farooki (2009), from COMTRADE data accessed via WITS in 
November 2008. The listing of metals-intensive sectors is available in Farooki 
(2009; Annex 1) 
 
With regard to agricultural inputs, a key component of demand at low per 
capita incomes is that for food products. Studies of urban consumers in China 
show that the income elasticity of demand for food falls from almost unity 
(0.96) at household incomes around Yuan2,500 ($375) p.a., to 0.4 for 
household incomes of Yuan7,500 ($1,125) and to 0.33 for household incomes 
of Yuan10,000 ($1,500)2. Thus, even though incomes are growing (and the 
income elasticity of demand for food is falling), there is considerable scope for 
sustained demand for food, particularly as in 2007, around 75 percent of 
Chinese households had an annual income of less than Yuan38,000 ($5,500) 
(Figure 5 below). Moreover, as incomes grow, the demand for meat expands, 
and this makes intensive use of grain (approximately four kilos of grain are 
required to produce one kilo of meat, Conceição and Mendoza, 2009). Thus 
food-availability is likely to be of considerable importance in the future in 
China, not least because whilst it has 20 percent of global population China 
possesses seven percent of global arable land.  
 
What these data show is that China’s growth path is particularly commodity-
intensive. There is nothing exceptional in this resource intensive growth path. 
It closely reflects China’s per capita income, which in 2008 was $5,510 
compared to $43,000 for the USA (PPP$). But two factors are worthy of 
notice. First, as Figure 4 shows, there is some way to go in per capita income 
levels before the resource intensity of growth declines. Based on the historic 
resource intensity of demand for aluminium, copper and steel in Korea, 
Japan, the EU-12 and the US, it seems unlikely that China’s (and India’s) 
demand for minerals and metals will decline in the foreseeable future, despite 
rapid economic growth and rising per capita incomes.  
 
                                            
2
  Adapted from Gale and Huang (2007 
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Figure 4. Per capita consumption of base metals 
 
 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2006 
 
Second, both China and India (as we have seen) are very large economies. 
Thus, in analysing their impact on global trade we have to suspend the small 
country assumption that no single economy’s trade pattern will shift the 
structure of global trade or the prices at which products are traded. As Table 9 
shows, China accounts for a rapidly-growing share of global consumption of 
key base metals and meat, and this has led some commentators (including 
ourselves – Kaplinsky, 2006 and 2009; Farooki, 2009) to conclude that at the 
least this helped explain the boom in commodity prices between 2001 and 
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2008, and perhaps may also play a historically-significant role in promoting a 
structural shift in the global commodities-manufactures terms of trade in 
favour of commodities 
 
Table 9: China’s Share of Global Consumption of Base Metals and Meat  
 1990 2000 2007 
Base Metals ( % Share of World Demand)1 
Aluminium 5 13 33 
Zinc 8 15 31 
Lead 7 10 31 
Iron Ore 4 16 48 
Copper 7 12 26 
Food Products (% Share of World Consumption)2 
Poultry 9 18 17 
Pork 35 47 46 
Beef 2 10 12 
Soybeans   40 
Source:1 Macquarie Commodities Research (2008) 
  2 Conceição and Mendoza (2008) 
3.2. The Nature of Import Demand 
Thus, we have observed that Chinese growth has led to a sharp rise in its 
share of global demand for commodities and perhaps also for a structural 
upward shift in the relative global price of commodities. But there is more that 
we can observe about China’s demand for commodities which is of relevance 
to global commodity value chains feeding into the Chinese economy. The key 
relevant factors are the demand-preferences of low income consumers, the 
consequent relative insignificance of standards in value chains, and the 
preference for the importation of relatively unprocessed products 
3.2.1. The Demand Preferences of Low Income Consumers 
The median income of individual consumers in the US in 2007 was $26,6253. 
The figure representing the poverty threshold in the UK (defined as 60 percent 
of average (median) annual incomes in 2007 was $35,4324. There is no 
gainsaying the existence of poverty in all of the high income economies, 
particularly when poverty is defined as a relative income5. There are 
undoubtedly also cases of significant absolute poverty in the north, for 
example, fuel poverty amongst the aged. However, whatever the degrees of 
inequality and deprivation are in the north, the incomes involved are in almost 
all cases way beyond those earned in low income economies such as China. 
Figure 5 shows the dispersion of incomes in the BRIC economies (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China) in 2007. From this it is evident that more than 270m 
                                            
3
  Source: US Census Bureau  
4
  Source: The Median Income before tax in 2007 was £ 17,700 (HM Revenue and 
Customs)  
5
  As Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) show, most indicators of welfare are more affected 
by relative than by absolute poverty levels. However, in this discussion we are not 
focusing on the welfare implications of income levels, but on their translation into the 
demand characteristics of consumption, so it is absolute income levels which draw 
out attention. 
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households in China and more than 170m households in India had total 
annual incomes of less than $5,000. By contrast, the median household 
income in 2007 was $50,233 in the US and $49,800 in the UK. 
 
Figure 5: Households According to Disposable Income Bracket in China, 
India, Brazil and Russia '000 households (2002/2007)  
 
Source: Euromonitor International from national statistics, cited in Media Eghbal 
(2008),  
 
In many cases, these households lived above the minimum $1 per day MDG 
threshold, particularly in China. But the point of significance is that most of 
these households in all of these BRIC economies were cash consumers, that 
is, they bought in a range of products, consumer, intermediate and capital 
goods. For these consumers, price is an overwhelming consideration in 
consumption. That is not to say that they do not care about quality and variety 
(the two key drivers of consumer demand in northern economies in recent 
decades – see Section 1 above), but that these preferences play a minor role 
in their consumption choices. Product differentiation (variety and quality) gives 
way to product “commodification” (standardisation in order to achieve low 
prices). To the best of our knowledge, this assertion is not evidenceable 
although the idea that low income markets provide scope for profitable 
production through the sale of low-value items is now widely acknowledged 
under the banner of the “fortune at the bottom of the pyramid” (Prahalad, 
2005). 
 
3.3.2. Imported-inputs are not standards-intensive 
Following on from the preferences of low income consumers, there will be 
derived implications for the role which standards play in value chains. In 
Section 1 (see Figure 1) we distinguished between process and product. We 
observed that there was a growing tendency for the standards intensity in 
value chains to grow, reflecting a combination of factors – firm specific 
concerns with standards (such as Q-C-D) to meet consumer needs for 
product diversity and product quality, government-standards to protect 
consumers, and civil-society-induced standards reflecting growing concerns 
with the ethics of productions systems and their environmental impact. In the 
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context of the dominance of (very) low consumer incomes in countries such 
as China and India, each of these drivers of standards is likely to be of very 
diminished significance (Figure 6). In general, firms are less concerned with 
product variety, so that the imperatives to achieve flexibility through just-in-
time production (and hence Q-C-D standards) are weak. Governments may 
either have poorly developed safety standards, or fail to implement them 
effectively. Recent cases in both China (baby milk) and India (pesticide in soft 
drinks) provide striking evidence of this6. Finally, the NGOs which have driven 
public opinion on issues such as FairTrade, labour standards and the 
environment are muted in low income countries and are likely to have little 
significance with regard to the incorporation of ethical and environmental 
standards in value chains. Indeed, particularly in China, NGOs often have a 
tenuous identity. 
 
Figure 6: How Important are Standards Likely to be in Value Chains 
Feeding into China and India? 
(An Elaboration of Figure 1 above) 
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3.2.3. The growth in imports of relatively unprocessed products 
A key objective of economic and industrial policy in most low income countries 
is to add value to natural resources: in South Africa, for example, the call is for 
the “beneficiation” of the country’s extensive mineral and agricultural products. 
Although there are dangers to this policy agenda (beneficiation, particularly of 
hard commodities, is often very capital and technology-intensive) there is a 
natural logic to this in many cases. Many commodities degrade rapidly and/or 
involve significant weight loss in processing. There are also evidenced cases 
of economies which have utilised their natural resources to drive forward their 
                                            
6
  http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2006/gb20060810_826414.htm 
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industrialisation (Wright and Czelusta, 2004). And, particularly in the 
processing of soft commodities, this is often a labour-intensive process and 
wage costs in low income exporting economies are generally a fraction of 
those in high income economies. Moreover, commodity processing is often 
very polluting. 
 
This logic of processing at source (rather than in the importing economy) 
applies easily – or relatively easily- when low income economies export 
commodities to high income economies. The high income economies are 
happy to see the pollution and energy intensive production processes located 
in low income countries; their high-technology, skill-intensive, high-wage and 
safe working environments in their producing sectors are generally more 
appropriate to the provision of capital and intermediate goods for resource-
processing industries rather than for the direct processing of commodities. 
However, when low income resource economies trade with low income 
importing economies, many of these factors which promote a win-win division 
of labour do not apply (Figure 7). Low income economies care less about the 
polluting nature and energy intensity of processing. Their industrial structures 
are well-pitched in terms of technological and skill intensity to specialise in 
processing, and their low labour costs enable them to do so at similar cost-
profiles to those operating in low income exporting economies. 
 
Figure 7: High and Low Income Commodity Importing Economies – 
Complementarity and Competition with Low Income Commodity 
Exporting Economies 
 High income importing 
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intensity 
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In the case of China and its imports of food products, there is an additional 
factor affecting the degree of processing involved in its imports. We have 
observed above, that the ratio of China’s population to its arable land 
suggests that however effective its agricultural sector might become, it seems 
likely that it will have to draw on agricultural imports as its economy continues 
to grow, and as food tastes shift increasingly towards meat products. After a 
brief flirtation with the importation of food products, the experience of global 
shortages of key food crops in 2007 and the associated rise in political 
tension, in countries as diverse as Cameroon and Indonesia, has 
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concentrated the minds of Chinese policy makers. In fact, China has pursued 
a strong self-sufficiency policy in grains since 1995, with the objective of 
domestic production meeting 95 percent of its domestic demand (Anderson 
and Peng, 1998). As a consequence, agricultural production shifted towards 
grains and away from other crops such as cotton, sugar beet and soybeans 
(Fang and Beghin, 1999). Given the shortage of land, this has increasingly 
meant that China’s agricultural imports have been concentrated in animal 
feeds (such as soya and palm oil) and products which compete with grains for 
land-use (such as inputs).  
 
There is another policy-related factor which also affects China’s growing 
importation of agricultural products. In the context of a growing perception of a 
future energy-crisis, China has (like other countries such as the US and the 
EU) begun to promote the production of bio-fuels. These need agricultural 
inputs, but given the primacy being given, for political reasons, to food self-
sufficiency, China has increasingly sought to source the inputs for bio-fuels 
from abroad as bio-fuel crops are generally planted on land used for food 
crops7. As we will see in Section 4 below, this explains the rapid growth of 
cassava chip imports from Thailand. 
 
4. HOW DOES THIS WORK IN PRACTICE: THE DYNAMICS OF 
TWO GLOBAL COMMODITY VALUE CHAINS 
 
In Sections 1-3 we have sketched a general picture of the likely evolution of 
southern based value chains as their markets shift from high income markets 
in the north to low income markets in the south in general, and to China in 
particular. Since these are general trends, they will be evidenced to a greater 
or lesser extent in particular sectors. Few sectors will evidence all of these 
emerging determinants in the structure of global value chains, but each is 
likely to be affected materially by one or more of these underlying trends. 
 
To illustrate the significance of this impact on global value chains in the south, 
we can observe the trajectories of two commodity global value chains – 
cassava in Thailand, and timber in Gabon. 
4.1. The Thai Cassava Value Chain 
Cassava is a widely grown crop globally. The major reason for this ubiquity is 
that it grows on relatively poor quality land and is relatively drought-resistant, 
thus serving as a food-crop-of-last-resort in many countries. But it is also an 
important intermediate product, feeding into the animal-feed, bioethanol and 
the starch markets. Since raw cassava is poisonous to human beings, bulky 
and perishable, the trade in cassava necessarily occurs in processed form. In 
2008, global trade in cassava products was $1.124bn, and although the 
largest producers were Brazil and Nigeria, Thailand was the world’s largest 
cassava exporter (Figure 8), accounting for around 80 percent of global trade 
                                            
7
  Von Braun (2007) estimates if current bio-fuel and investment plans were to carry on, 
the world price by 2020, for major food crops could rise by 11% for cassava, 26% for 
maize, 18% for oilseeds, about 12% for sugar and 8% for wheat 
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in both major product families ($910m) (http://comtrade.un.org/, accessed 26 
November 2009)  
 
Figure 8: Thailand’s Share in World Cassava Exports (1961-2007) 
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Source: FAOstatistics, http://faostat.fao.org/ accessed 13 Nov 2009 
 
 
Cassava plays an important role in the Thai economy. In 2007, it was the 
second most important crop after rice in terms of value and the third after 
sugarcane and rice in terms of volume. At $948m in 2007, combined dried 
cassava and cassava starch exports were its third biggest agricultural export 
after rubber and rice (Source: FAOstat accessed 13 Nov 2009). Unlike other 
major producers of cassava, there is little domestic direct consumption of 
cassava as a food product in Thailand, where almost all output is used as an 
intermediate product in other sectors. In 2008, an estimated 66 percent of all 
Thai cassavas was exported, 26 percent was utilised domestically and the 
rest was kept as stock (Office of Agricultural Economics as quoted by TTSA in 
http://tapiocathai.org, accessed 14 Dec 09).This represents a somewhat 
unusual story of an “alien” food crop being introduced into a low income 
economy (in this case, dating back to the 1950s) and initially thriving solely as 
an exported intermediate product used in the food industry in other 
economies8. 
                                            
8
  Thailand’s rapid expansion of cassava exports reflected two factors. The first was the 
well-developed external marketing capabilities of its Chinese trading community. The 
second was the heavy investment in infrastructure in the north-eastern region during 
the 1960s and 1970s, designed to counter the political influence of communist 
insurgents. The north-east has become the major cassava growing region in the 
country. 
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4.1.1. The Cassava Value Chain 
There are essentially two families of products in the Thai cassava sector 
(Figure 9). These are the dried cassava value chain and the starch value 
chain. 
 
The dried cassava value chain, in turn, comprises two product segments – 
dried chips and cassava pellets.  
 
• Cassava chips are inputs into both the animal feeds and bio-fuels 
industries, and involves the sorting of root tubers which are then 
crudely cut and dried in open-air drying yards. Lower-grade “normal 
chips” are fed into the cassava pellet and bio-fuels industries. The 
higher-grade “clean chips” are used directly as domestic animal feed, 
but require the peeling and cleaning of tubers, necessitating 
rudimentary forms of mechanisation (using rotating drums or a screen 
filter), and an additional day of drying. They have a lower sand and 
fibre content than “normal” chips  
 
• Cassava pellets process “normal chips” and/or low grade wastage from 
the starch industry. These inputs are ground and steamed, perhaps 
mixed with starch residue, and then moulded into pellets. The 
manufacturing process embodies some limited scale economies,9 and 
more skilled labour and capital than is required in the production of 
either clean or normal chips. 
 
The starch value chain also comprises two sub-products - “native” and 
“modified” starch (although a small quantity of sago is also produced). These 
starches have industrial uses, with modified starch feeding into more 
technologically-intensive value chains. Modified starch involves a further step 
of processing after the production of native starch, reflected in the fact that 
while roots constitute 70-75 percent of total production cost for native starch, 
they only account for around 46 percent of the costs of modified starch 
(fieldwork interviews; Titapiwatanakun, 1994). In addition to being used in 
other industrial sectors, some of the native starch waste is sold to the pellet 
plants which combine this with “normal” cassava chips to produce animal 
feed. The typical starch factory operates at around 850 root-tonnes per day.  
 
 
                                            
9
  Typically, an average pellet plant processes around 575 root-tonnes a day, compared 
to an average of 70 root-tonnes in the drying yards.  
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Figure 9: The Thai Cassava Value Chains 
 
 
 
4.1.2. Market Requirements for Cassava-Based Products 
There are two established and one emerging export markets for Thailand’s 
dried cassava (chips and pellets)– the EU and China, and in recent years 
Korea. Each of these markets has particular trajectories and requirements. 
The smaller starch export market is more diversified.  
 
The EU 
The origin of Thailand’s dried cassava industry can be traced back to the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Demand for Thai cassava pellets 
expanded rapidly after the introduction of the CAP in 1962, where the 
resulting high domestic cereal price triggered the search by EU feed 
manufacturers for cheaper alternative feed ingredients. Exports of cassava to 
the EU expanded rapidly, reaching a peak of almost nine million tonnes in 
1989. Initially these involved exports of cassava chips, but for a series of 
reasons, pellets became the dominant and then the exclusive cassava 
product exported to the EU. Since dried cassava was used in compound-feed 
production, cleanliness and uniformity of shape and size were important to 
ease the large scale mechanised mixing of dried cassava with other feed 
ingredients. In addition, the distance between EU and Thailand required less 
bulky products, favouring pellets over chips. Moreover, the transportation of 
chips is dusty, and in 1978 EU environmental regulation mandated the 
introduction of a less dusty form of dried cassava, again favouring pellets over 
chips. Finally, as cassava pellets are used in feed production, imports are 
starch waste 
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starch waste 
dried native 
starch or slurry 
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via exporters 
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governed by the EU farm-to-fork policy, which requires traceability. HACCP 
and GMP certification became a mandatory requirement for entry into the EU, 
and pellet production lent itself more favourably to this form of certification 
(Box 3). 
 
 
Box 3: Standards Governing Production in the Thai Dried Cassava 
Value Chain 
 
Minimum export standards required by the Thai Ministry of Commerce 
For both pellets and chips, there are a number of technical export standards 
required by the Thai Ministry of Commerce (MoC), based on Notification of 
MoC B.E.2545 (2002) for sale into the domestic animal-feed market. The 
main ones are minimum starch content of 65 percent, maximum crude fibre 
of five percent, maximum moisture of 14 percent, maximum sand of three 
percent, and free from foreign materials. However, despite these export 
standards, some exports (including residue exports to Korea) are shipped to 
a lower starch content (see below). 
 
Standards governing product entry into the EU 
EU ‘farm to fork’ policy, introduced in 2000 requires the traceability of 
products used in food and feed production. Compliance for traceability and 
hygiene requirements is obtained through HACCP and GMP certifications on 
the pellet plants.  
 
• HACCP ("Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point") certification is 
required as cassava pellets are part of the animal feed-food chain. 
 
• GMP (”Good Manufacturing Practice”) relates to the sanitary and 
processing requirements necessary to ensure the production of 
wholesome food. 
 
The requirement for HACCP is based on European Council Directive 
89/397/EEC of 14 June 1989 on the official control of foodstuffs, and Council 
Directive 93/43/EEC of 14 June 1993 on the hygiene of foodstuffs. The 
HACCP system has to be implemented in relation to products and 
production processes.  
 
Standards governing product entry into China 
No official standards govern product entry into China. However, since 
cassava chips are used as a bio-fuels feedstock, Chinese buyers 
customarily specify a 67 percent starch content compared to the 65 percent 
level required to meet Thai Ministry of Commerce export standards. This 
also tends to be higher than the starch levels required by EU and Korean 
buyers where cassava exports are sold to the animal-feed market. 
 
Standards governing product entry into Korea 
No distinct standard certification is required for entry into the Korean market, 
but there are technical standards specified by buyers (notably a 55 percent 
starch content). 
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However this attractiveness of Thai cassava as an animal-feed input for EU 
livestock producers was undermined by a series of trade restrictions 
introduced in the 1980s and early 1990s, and then particularly by the 1992 
reform of the CAP. EU domestic cereals became increasingly competitive with 
cassava pellets. By 2005, pellets export to the EU had collapsed to 250,000 
tonnes, compared to a peak of over nine million tonnes in 1989 (UN-
COMTRADE, http://comtrade.un.org, accessed 26 November 2009; TTTA, 
2009) and price pressure grew. In 2008, pellets exports to the EU had 
regrown to 989,000 tonnes, still only 10 percent of the 1989 peak (UN-
COMTRADE, http://comtrade.un.org, accessed 03 December 2009). 
 
China 
The demand for imported cassava chips into China reflects the related desire 
by the Chinese government for food self-sufficiency, the growth in the demand 
for meat by consumers, and the development of its bio-fuels sector. As we 
saw above, Chinese policy privileges the production of food grains for 
domestic consumers, which means that the requirements for animal feed and 
feedstock for bio-fuels have increasingly had to be met via imports. This has 
led to the growing importation of soya products from Latin America and 
cassava from Thailand. Alternative feed stocks into bio-fuels such as 
molasses have been discouraged due to environmental concerns (OAE, 
2006). 
 
The bulk of Thailand’s cassava exports to China occurs in the form of dried 
cassava (cassava chips rather than pellets), and is used as an input in the 
production of bio-fuels (Table 10). These imports began at a small scale in the 
mid 1990s, but grew rapidly in the 2000s, following a wheat harvest failure in 
2001 and the liberalisation of trade barriers in agricultural products under the 
China ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in 2003. This rapid growth in part 
reflected the removal of a six percent tariff previously imposed by China on 
Thai cassava products. 
 
Table 10: Thai Cassava Exports to China (US $ Millions) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total ($m) 109.02 137.44 236.74 329.87 474.81 417.62 288.30 
Of which (%) 
Dried cassava 94.10 94.66 90.04 89.44 87.61 83.26 72.57 
Cassava starch 5.90 5.34 9.96 10.56 12.39 16.74 27.43 
Source: UN-COMTRADE, http://comtrade.un.org, accessed 26 November 
2009 
 
China’s demand for starch as an intermediate input into non-food industries 
has increased rapidly in recent years and the share of starches in cassava 
imports from Thailand grew from only six percent in 1998 to 27 percent in 
2008.  
 
Korea 
South Korea mostly imports residue pellets made out of starch waste with a 
low starch content of 55 percent, compared to the pellets imported by the EU, 
which are made mostly (70% to 80%) from chips and which has 65 percent 
29 
starch content. Korea is a very new entrant into the Thai export market, 
importing virtually nothing until 2007, and then taking 16 percent of dried 
cassava imports (mostly low-grade pellets) in 2008. 
 
4.1.3 Changes in Market Destination and Product Composition 
Two major changes can be observed in the export composition of Thai 
cassava products. The first is the change in destination. The Thai dried 
cassava industry– essentially a “creation” of the EU CAP after 1962 - was 
potentially devastated after the reforms to EU agricultural policy in the early 
1990s. This reform of the cereal price support system reduced the price 
competitiveness of cassava pellets imports as an animal-feed. Fortuitously for 
the Thai industry, the Chinese market began to grow rapidly, soon after the 
EU market was falling. This changing balance in export destination is shown 
in Figure 10. Total export volume hovered around 4m metric tonnes during the 
1990s, but the share of the EU fell from almost 95 percent in 1999, to less 
than 10 percent in 2005, subsequently reviving somewhat to around 30 
percent in 2008. The share of dried cassava (pellets) exports to Korea grew 
rapidly from merely two percent in 2004 to 16 percent in 2008 (UN-
COMTRADE. http://comtrade.un.org, accessed 03 Dec 2009, TTTA, 2004 and 
2009). 
 
Figure 10: Thai Dried Cassava Export: the Shift in Destinations 
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Source: UN-COMTRADE. http://comtrade.un.org, accessed 03 Dec 2009, 
TTTA, 2004 and 2009 
 
Given different demand patterns in the EU and China, this shift in export 
destination saw associated changes in the product composition of Thai 
cassava exports (Figure 11). The major change has been from pellet to 
cassava chip exports. But an important subsidiary change in Thai cassava 
export has been the growth of starch exports to China. This grew from six 
30 
percent of Thailand’s cassava exports to China in 2002 to 27 percent in 2008. 
However, within starch exports to China, there has been a marked shift from 
modified to native starches (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 1110: Thai Cassava Export Composition Volume- Final Products 
(1975-2008) 
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Source: TTTA (2004, 2009)  
 
                                            
10
  There are major differences in the data on production and trade provided by the 
TTTA and COMTRADE. To facilitate a comparative analysis of Thai export trade we 
have used COMTRADE as a data source on exports. But since COMTRADE data 
does not distinguish between pellets and chips, TTTA is used a the source of the 
product composition of dried cassava trade.  
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Figure 12: Shares in Thai Cassava Starch Export to China (2001-2006) 
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Source: TTSA (2008) 
 
4.1.4. Consequences 
What have been the consequences of these shifts in the related market and 
product composition of Thai cassava exports over the past decade? Here it is 
helpful to distinguish between dried cassava exports and starch exports. 
 
Dried cassava exports 
The transition from pellets to chips has essentially knocked out a stage of 
processing. Chip production is a labour-intensive operation occurring in open-
air drying yards – the raw cassava is cut, sorted, placed in the sun to dry and 
then aggregated and exported in bulk containers. Pellet production builds on 
cassava chip production, adding value by steaming and moulding the semi-
processed cassava chips in a factory. It is an inherently more technologically 
complex operation, involving greater operational and managerial skills, not as 
a substitute to chip production, but as a complement to chip production. This 
change in product therefore represents a move down the technological chain, 
and at the margin pushes Thai producers backwards into agricultural rather 
than manufacturing comparative advantage. 
 
This has implications for factor utilisation. Table 11 simulates the employment 
and capital costs which would result if all of Thailand’s cassava production in 
2008/2009 (29 million tonnes of cassava roots) were to be exported as either 
chips, or pellets or starches (as reflected in the current mix of exports). It 
shows that the additional stage of pellet production over chip production 
would lead to an additional 9,568 jobs (an increment of 52 percent in 
employment), but at a higher capital cost of $6m (increasing capital costs by 
30 percent). The capital cost per job created in pellet production is only $627. 
It would also add an additional 168 production units, contributing to the 
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diversification of entrepreneurship and to the potential geographical 
diversification of production.  
 
Table 11: Factor Utilisation and Number of Establishments if all Cassava 
were to be Produced as Chips, Pellets Or Starches* 
 Chips Pellets (incl. chips) All starches 
Employment 
 
18,281 
 
27,84911 
(of which 9,568 in 
pelletisation) 
29,734 
Capital cost $m) 19.97 25.96 44.73 
Number of firms 1,373 168 pelletisation plants 1,373 drying yards 114 
* Capital cost from Roonnaphai (2006); all other data from fieldwork 
 
A further consequence of the transition from the EU-pellet market to the 
Chinese cassava market is a removal in the role of standards in production 
processes and in products. As we saw in Box 3 above, cassava chips 
exported to China are only required to have a minimum starch content. By 
comparison, pellet exports to the EU are required to satisfy demanding EU 
farm-to-fork GM and HACCP standards. Arguably, the achievement of these 
standards requires more sophisticated managerial processes and higher 
labour skills, contributing to the growth of capabilities in the Thai economy. 
 
Finally, there are knock-on effects which can be broadly understood as value 
chain governance issues. Pellets exports to the EU occurs in bulk and in long-
haul 50,000 tonne ships and are controlled by four northern-based commodity 
traders (including Cargill and Toepfer) who assemble consignments of 6,000-
7,000t from individual Thai exporters12. These exports occur mostly through 
long-term forward contracts which provide a predictable income stream for 
producers and local aggregators. By contrast, in general chip exports to China 
are sold on a spot-price basis, and provide for far less predictability since 
when prices fell suddenly in 2008, many Chinese importers reneged on 
agreed prices. As a consequence, many Thai firms continue to supply to the 
EU, even though margins on this trade have fallen in recent years as the 
changing agricultural price support system in the EU has led to increasing 
price competition from other animal feeds. 
 
Starch exports 
If the transition from the EU pellets market to the Chinese chip market 
represents a downgrading of value addition and capability-building, the same 
results are not true when we compare Chinese demand for starches with EU 
demand for pellets.  
 
                                            
11
  Assuming all pellets made out of chips. In reality many pellet factories also use starch 
residue as an input 
12
  Thai ‘exporters’ to EU are actually just assemblers, they only handle paperwork on 
the Thai side, port handling and off and on loading from lighters (small boats) to big 
long haul vessels, which are normally organised by the 4 major EU agricultural 
traders. 
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Starch production is considerably more technologically intensive than are 
either chip or pellet production. This is particularly true in the case of modified 
starches – as we saw above, modified starch involves considerably greater 
processing than does native starch. Hence in this case, the transition from the 
EU to the Chinese market would be reflected in an increase in technological 
complexity and skill requirements, greater than that involved in the jump from 
cassava chip to pellet production. Moreover, it would lead to an increase in 
around seven percent in total employment, since the packaging stage in 
starch production is particularly labour-intensive, as well as a considerable 
increase in skills. This increase in employment would, however, come at a 
considerable capital cost, with a more than doubling of investment over chip 
production (123 percent, an additional $25m), a 72 percent increase ($18.8m) 
over pellet production and a capital cost per job on $2,162, still comparatively 
low by contemporary industrial production, but more than three times to cost 
per job in pellet production.  
 
So, at one level, the transition from the EU pellet to the Chinese starch market 
might suggest an augmentation of capabilities. However, within starch 
production, there has been an important shift in recent years which mirrors the 
pellet versus starch story. That is, whereas Chinese starch imports from 
Thailand comprised around a 50:50 split between modified and native 
starches in 2001, the share of the more processed modified starches 
produced in more technologically complex production processes had fallen to 
only 25 percent in 2006 (TTSA, 2008). China’s declining demand for modified 
starch might reflect the building of China’s own starch modification capacity 
rather than a decline in demand. Modified starch (made from all starches, not 
just cassava) production in China has increased consistently from just 20,000t 
in 1991, to 60,000t in 1994, 330,000t in 2001 and to almost 650,000t in 2006 
(Wang, 2002:34; Wang, 2007). If this trend continues, Thailand might be 
relegated to a supplier of native starch, with the more sophisticated 
modification taking place in China. The Thai industry hopes for a more 
complex future, with premium grade native starches and the most complex 
modified starches being produced in Thailand and intermediate grades of 
modified starches produced in China. On the basis of past trajectories, 
however, their ability to achieve this outcome must be in doubt. 
4.2. Gabon’s Timber Value Chain 
We observed in Section 3 above that comparative historical analysis on the 
basis of historical experience suggests a “normal” pattern in which the early 
stages of growth are dominated by agricultural products, followed by the 
growing share of manufacturing, maturing into economies with a large service 
sector. The development of the timber and timber-related sectors tends to be 
one of the primary stages of industrial growth, partly because timber-products 
(such as furniture and housing) have high income elasticities of demand at 
low levels of income, partly because the timber related sectors are labour 
intensive (and hence encourage production at low wage levels), and partly 
because timber-processing is closely related to the agricultural sectors which 
dominate low income economies. 
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The trajectory of the timber sector mirrors this transition in macroeconomic 
structure as depicted in the “Forest Transition model (Grainger, 1995; Mather, 
1992; Mather and Needle, 1998; Rudel et al., 2005), During the pre-industrial 
phase, forests in the now mature northern economies were predominantly 
used for grazing, the collection of fodder, fuelwood and non-wood forest 
products, as well as for timber (Farrella et al., 2000; Mather, 2001). Until the 
18th century, European forests were a hybrid of agricultural and timber 
production. During the following industrial phase trees were ‘mined’. But as 
forests were depleted, remaining forest areas increasingly required more 
management. This led to new forms of ownership, with privately owned 
enclosures replacing communal forests (Humphreys, 2006; Mather and 
Needle, 1999). For most of the 19th and 20th centuries forests in Europe and 
North America were “industrialised” and the timber was fed into related 
industries. As a result of timber shortages in Europe (and later its ‘newly 
depleted’ outposts in North America), colonies in Africa and Asia were drawn 
on to fill the domestic wood gaps. Colonies were often treated as so-called 
resource taps (Jorgenson, 2008).  
 
After the 1950s, northern forestry industries moved into the post-industrial 
phase. Technological change in agriculture led to yield increases, making land 
available for forest expansion (Kauppi et al., 2006; Rudel et al., 2005; Victor 
and Ausubel, 2000). At the same time, societal perspectives on the functions 
of forests began to change, and an increasing affluent urban population 
exerted pressure on domestic forest management to cater to their needs of 
recreation and regeneration. They also focused on the need to avoid the loss 
of biodiversity in forests (Bazett, 2000; Nilsson, 1999), and in recent years 
have become increasingly concerned that deforestation will lead to the 
erosion of the carbon-sinks, which mitigate against climate change.  
 
In southern economies, much of the tropical deforestation of the late 19th and 
the 20th centuries can be attributed to export-directed logging activities as 
wages in northern economies grew and as they ran out of sustainable forests. 
The overwhelming majority of logging took place through an expansion of the 
extensive margin, with little attention being placed on sustainable cultivation. 
Forests increasingly came under state authority with the primary objective of 
maximising timber extraction, and forest land was taken by new settlers for 
agricultural purposes, thereby replacing traditional communal stewardship and 
common property systems (Humphreys, 2006; White and Martin, 2002). 
 
4.2.1. The Forest Value Chain in Gabon 
Situated on the West Coast of Africa, Gabon is a resource-rich economy with 
relatively high levels of per capita income, currently around four times the 
SSA average. It is a major exporter of oil, with a population of only 1.5m. 
Gabon possesses more than 200,000km2 of forests, as well as extensive 
deposits of manganese and iron ore which are only just being opened up for 
exploitation. Rents derived from the oil-sector are substantial, and even 
though they are very unevenly spread, the contribution of non-oil sectors to 
GDP is small. The forest sector accounts for less than three percent of GDP 
(Melhado, 2007; OECD, 2009).  
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Gabon’s forests are part of the second largest tropical ecosystem after the 
Amazon, namely the Congo Basin, which covers 1.8m square kilometres, 
stretching across six countries13. In Gabon, nearly 85 percent of its total land 
mass is covered with forests, making it the second most heavily forested 
country in Africa (FAO, 2005, 2007). Gabon is the seventh largest tropical log 
producer globally, and the third largest log exporter with a share of 14 percent 
of total exports in 2007 (FAOSTAT). While Gabon’s forests are made up of 
between 300-400 species, one – Okoumé – dominates. Around 70-80 percent 
of its forests contain Okoumé, and this species only exists in comparatively 
smaller volumes in parts of Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, and the Republic of 
the Congo (ITTO, 2006; UNEP and WCMC). Okoumé is particularly favoured 
due to its easy peeling quality, that is when fresh it can be peeled without prior 
steaming. Between 1987 and 1996, more than 70 percent of log exports were 
Okoumé (Collomb et al., 2000), but since then this proportion has fallen to 
around half of total exports (SEPBG, 2009). 
 
Gabon’s timber value chain is shown in Figure 13. A small proportion of 
harvested trees is converted into finished products which are consumed 
domestically (c). But the overwhelming bulk is exported either directly as logs 
(a), or as sawn-wood (b.i), veneer sheets (b.ii) or plywood (b.iii). A very small 
proportion of timber is used to manufacture railway sleepers both for domestic 
consumption and export. 
                                            
13
  Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. 
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Figure 13: Domestic Timber Value Chain in Gabon 
 
 
Note: Bold arrows symbolize major raw material and product flows 
 
Until very recently, Gabon’s timber sector was unregulated and out of the 
political focus. But with the growth of environmental concerns about climate 
change, the timber industry has become a subject of increasing regulation, 
both within and without Gabon. In the light of decreasing oil production and 
following pressure from external donors that Gabon regulate this key resource 
to use it as a primary driver of industrial diversification, the state introduced a 
sectoral programme for forests, fisheries, and the environment (Programme 
Sectoriel Forêt, Pêche et Environnement), involving major reforms of the 
forestry sector (Leigh and Olters, 2006; Söderling, 2006; Wunder, 2003). This 
included the abolition of the state-owned export monopoly (SNBG) and the 
introduction of a new legislative framework, the Forestry Code, in 2001. The 
overall focus shifted from raw material extraction towards the industrialisation 
of the forestry sector through increasing domestic processing of sustainably-
managed forests (Methot and Ndongou, 2009). Inter alia, the Forestry Code 
involves: 
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• The re-design of the concessionary allocation system using a closed 
auction system to increase transparency 
• The introduction of new types of concessions, with two types of 
commercial concessions each with a total maximum surface area and a 
minimum duration of exploitation 
• The reform of the tax system to stimulate local processing capacities, and 
to promote resource transfers to rural populations 
• The introduction of local processing requirements to stimulate the 
processing of at least 75 percent of wood before exporting by January 
2012  
• Production quotas are assigned to individual companies and tied to the 
type of concession. 
 
The setting of explicit targets to deepen processing built on the trajectories of 
a few large European-owned companies, which had established processing 
plants to manufacture primary processed wood products during the 1990s. 
Complemented by the requirements of the 2001 Forestry Code to process 
logs domestically, this has led to a rapid increase in Gabon’s production of 
sawn-wood, veneer sheets and plywood (Figure 14). Nevertheless, in 2007 
the major share of Gabon’s timber (87 percent) was exported as raw logs, and 
on current trends there is little hope of meeting the Forestry Code objective of 
75 percent domestic raw material processing by 2012. 
 
Figure 14: Production Volumes of Selected Wood Products in Gabon  
(in 1,000 m3) 
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Source:  Authors calculations based on FAO ForesSTAT data accessed November 2009 
from http://faostat.fao.org 
 
The external pressures on Gabon’s timber industry explicitly targeted two 
related objectives. The first, exerted by external donors as a direct pressure 
on the Gabonese government, was designed to promote greater transparency 
in the management of the forestry sector in order to facilitate the sustainable 
management of this key global resource and to widen the distribution of 
benefits from the exploitation of the forests. The second set of pressures were 
indirect in that they were not aimed directly at Gabon. They involved a series 
of standards which global buyers set to ensure the sustainable management 
of the forests and the legality of wood products that they sourced. This, as we 
will see below, led to a combination of both private and public standards 
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governing the procurement of wood from Gabon and other sources of tropical 
hardwoods. 
4.2.2. Market Requirements for Gabon’s Timber Products  
Two distinct export markets can be identified for Gabon’s timber products – 
the EU, particularly France its prior colonial ruler, and China. 
 
The EU  
Gabon’s timber exporting industry is a “creation” of French industry, reflecting 
the industrial phase in the Forest Transition trajectory in which northern firms 
– squeezed out of domestic sources of timber supply – indentified cheap 
sources of raw material supply in ex-colonies. Timber exports from Gabon to 
France (the major external market) started with colonial settlements during the 
1850s-80s, and persisted after independence when French interests shifted 
towards mining activities (Wunder, 2003). Over time, total export volumes to 
France have risen from around 300,000 m3 in 1989 (from when reliable 
records are available) to nearly 600,000 m3 in the peak year of 2002. But, as 
processing capacities rose in Gabon, these log exports were complemented 
by exports of sawn-wood, veneers and plywood, jointly reaching a roundwood 
equivalent of 230,000m3, exceeding the export of logs to France in 2006 
(220,000m3).  
 
Figure 15: Gabon’s Exports of Logs and Processed Wood Products to 
France (Round-wood Equivalent, in 1,000 m3) 
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The EU market for timber products saw four important changes after the 
1980s. First, the EU’s long-term dominance of global wooden furniture exports 
was eroded, particularly by expanding exports from China. In 1992, Chinese 
furniture exports were only 14 percent of Italian and 19 percent of German 
exports (the two leading global furniture exporters). In 2008, Chinese furniture 
exports were 2.3 times those of Italy and 2.6 times those of Germany 
(calculated from UN Comtrade Database). Second, as wage levels rose in the 
EU, so the competitiveness of its wood processing industries fell in 
comparison to low income economies, who at the same time had developed 
their capabilities significantly in these processing sectors. This led to a 
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migration of wood processing activities out of high income economies as the 
timber furniture value chain extended. Third, governments became 
increasingly aware of health and safety, and regulations were instituted in 
many sectors to ensure higher levels of safety for consumers. Finally, the 
growth of per capita incomes led to greater consumer concerns with the 
environment and with ethical standards in value chains. In the timber sector, 
organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund and Friends of the Earth 
increasingly exerted pressure on producers to promote biodiversity and 
sustainability in forestry (Gulbrandsen and Humphreys, 2006; Stringer, 2006). 
 
The growing prevalence of these standards in the EU market is reflected in 
Box 4 which summarises the major trends in Europe with regard to the 
preferences of buyers in their purchasing of timber and the standards 
governing access to EU markets. 
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China:  
China is a relative wood-resource poor country with a low forest per capita 
density (0.13 ha relative to a world average of 0.65). Additionally, many of its 
forests reserves were depleted due to extensive logging beginning in the late 
1950s (Démurger, Yuanzhao, and Weiyong, 2007). This has led to the 
Box 4: Standards Governing Access to EU and Other OECD Markets 
 
Three sets of standards affect the entry of timber products into high income 
markets such as those in the EU. 
 
The critical success factors of buyers 
Importers acquire timber as a raw material or as an intermediate product for 
processing in other sectors. They trade-off a series of critical success factors, the 
most prominent of which for logs are price, volume, quality, species and 
environmental compliance. For processed wood, the dominant critical success 
factors are price, volume, quality, product specifications, and environmental 
considerations. 
 
Industry-specific standards 
Responding to concerns from civil society, two major sets of standards have 
emerged to protect forest ecosystems and the sustainability of forest resources. 
European, buyers increasingly require legality certification. In particular OLB 
(Origine et Légalité des Bois) certifies that the particular logging company is the 
legal owner of the concession and has the right to sell the specified logs. This 
includes verifying that the concession-holder has met its statutory obligations such 
as paying all relevant taxes. Legality certification is increasingly under the umbrella 
of the EU FLEGT programme (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade), 
whose primary main aim is to eradicate illegal timber trade.  
 
Sustainability certification is designed to promote the sustainable use of forests. 
The primary standard here is the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) scheme, which 
provides the systematic recording of sustainable production standards, and a chain 
of custody certificate tracing timber all the way through the value chain and has 
wide-ranging requirements including the protection of the rights of indigenous 
peoples. The ISO 14000 standards are also protective of the environmental impact 
of the timber value chain. 
 
Public standards 
Public standards are mandatory and affect health and safety concerns in the timber 
value chain. These technical features are, for example, covered by formaldehyde 
emissions arising from the adhesives used to produce plywood, chemicals used in 
the production of medium-density fibreboards or pollution from paint. Phytosanitary 
requirements ensure that "the producer has been capable of cleaning, sanitizing, 
sterilizing or by other means to render the offered commodity free from unwanted 
dirt, seeds, pests or germs" (Tissari, 2009:3). In case of sawnwoods, the cut edges 
are therefore treated with a special paint to prevent both infestation as well as 
decay. Other technical standards are building codes, and product testing 
requirements (Pro Forest, 2009; Sun et al, 2008).  
 
Increasingly, where a government agency is the direct procurer of wood and wood 
products, EU countries have set Green Public Procurement Standards (GPP) for 
suppliers 
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Chinese government imposing logging restrictions in an attempt to stop 
further deforestation and environmental degradation (Bowyer, Howe, Guillery, 
and Fernholz, 2004; White et al., 2006; Zhang and Gan, 2007). At the same 
time, Chinese industry was making increasing use of wood in its furniture and 
wood panel industries, as well as in its massive housing and infrastructure 
investments (Section 3.1 above). Chinese government officials reported an 
estimated gap of 140-150 million cubic meters in 2006 alone (Canby, Hewitt, 
Bailey, Katsigris, and Xiufang, 2008).  
 
China’s demand for wood has thus grown rapidly. But at the same time, its 
competences in wood using industries have also expanded (Table 12), so that 
the shortfall in supply translated into the imports of logs, as opposed to 
processed wood. This is evident from Figure 16 which whilst documenting a 
gradual increase in sawn-wood imports, is most remarkable for the decline in 
the volume of imports of both veneer sheets and plywood, and a very rapid 
increase in imports of raw, unprocessed logs. China used to import plywood in 
the past but became a net exporter after 2001 (Adams and Ma, 2002; 
Changjin et al., 2008; Kozak and Canby, 2007; White et al., 2006). However, 
though having developed rapidly over the past decade the Chinese wood 
processing industry is still not as advanced as their Northern counterparts. 
Consequently, whereas the North has the technology to process wood of 
smaller diameter and with differing wood fibre characteristics (for example, 
plantation wood grown in temperate climates), Chinese industries are 
believed to continue to demand large diameter logs from first/second growth 
natural forests (grown in sub-tropical and tropical climates) (Bowyer et al., 
2004). 
 
Table 12: China’s Growing Share of Global Exports in Timber 
Processing Industries (1992/2008) 
Product 1992 2008 
Furniture 2.7 24.7 
Veneer 0.7 0.1 
Plywood 0.2 0.2 
Fibreboard 0.5 11.4 
Source: UN COMTRADE, accessed 17 December 2009 
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Figure 16: China’s Imports of Logs and Selected Wood Products  
(1,000 m3) 
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Source:  FAO ForesSTAT data accessed November 2009 from http://faostat.fao.org 
 
But whilst China’s demand for timber products has grown, there has been little 
evidence of market access being governed by the sorts of standards affecting 
Gabon’s exports of timber to the EU. Instead, given the large number of 
companies, low barriers to entry and exit, little product differentiation, 
competition in the Chinese wood processing value chain is intense often 
leading to an erosion of profit margins. Many processing mills are thought to 
survive only due to state subsidies such as value-added tax rebates (Changjin 
et al., 2008; TFT, 2007). With the exception of some large foreign enterprises 
or joint ventures, wood processing companies largely follow a low-cost/low-
price competitive strategy with a focus on quantity rather than quality. For 
example, furniture and other wood products are usually of low-to-medium 
quality (Castaño, 2002; Changjin et al., 2008).  
 
There are few signs that Chinese civil society is exerting the sorts of 
pressures evident in northern countries where NGOs actively lobby to ensure 
high environmental standards in the timber value chain. There is compelling 
evidence that a significant (but unknown14) share of Chinese log imports are 
“illegally sourced”15, including from Gabon (Environmental Investigation 
Agency, 2005; ITTO, 2005; Stark and Cheung, 2006). It is widely argued that 
China is at the centre of illegal log trade and processing (Global Timber, 2009; 
Greenpeace, 2005; Katsigris et al., 2002; White et al., 2006)16. Insofar as the 
Chinese market shows any distinctive preferences for wood products, 
consumers appear to like dark wood characteristics, as do Indian consumers. 
Chinese producers favour Okoumé (a variety with which Gabon is particularly 
                                            
14
  The share of illegally sourced logs of total log trade volumes is estimated to be around 
ten percent (Environmental Investigation Agency, 2005). 
15
  Illegal logging occurs when timber is harvested, transported, bought or sold in 
contravention of national laws (EIA and Greenpeace retrieved from the world wide web, 
August 2009) 
16
  “China’s sources for hardwood log imports reads like a who’s who of countries with 
problems with illegal logging” (EIA, 2005:3) 
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well-endowed and whose fibre characteristics make it ideal for peeling), and 
darker hardwoods. This contrasts with European preferences for lighter-
coloured woods. 
 
EU and China market comparison 
This contrast between the drivers of consumption and the determinants of 
market access in the EU and China surfaces in the preferences of global 
buyers operating in Gabon. Buyers from China tend to place a premium on 
low price and large volumes. They are generally less concerned with specific 
varieties than are the EU buyers, and also show particularly low preferences 
for environmental compliance and the quality of the logs, which they are 
purchasing (Figure 17). Specifically with respect to environmental standards, 
Chinese buyers make very few demands from Gabonese suppliers, 
particularly in comparison to EU buyers (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 17: European and Chinese buyers’ requirements – wood logs 
(1=not important; 5=very important) 
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Source: Interviews with producers and key industry informants in Gabon 
 
Figure 18: EU and Chinese buyers’ requirements –international 
regulations and standards (1=not important; 5=very important)* 
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Source: Interviews with producers and key industry informants in Gabon 
Note: * See Box 4 for details of standards 
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Changes in market destination of Gabon’s timber exports 
From Gabon’s perspective, the evolution of the EU and the Chinese markets 
has had major consequences for the direction and nature of its timber exports. 
Beginning with the direction of exports, China (and India) have now become 
the dominant global importers of tropical hardwoods as EU economies have 
moved to the imports of processed woods and have become increasingly 
concerned about the sustainability of global hardwood reserves. Between 
1990 and 2007, China’s share of global imports rose from 14 percent to 68 
percent (and India from five percent to 17 percent), whilst the share of all 
OECD economies collapsed from 78 to 11 percent (Table 13). With 1990 as 
the base-year, in 2007 China’s imports of tropical hardwood had more than 
quadrupled in volume terms; in the same period, EU and wider OECD imports 
had fallen by more than 90 percent. 
 
Table 13: Share of Global Tropical Log Importers for Selected Countries 
1990 1997 2007 
Japan 39.5% Japan 32.3% China 68.2% 
Korea, Rep. 16.1% China 29.2% India 17.2% 
China 13.9% Korea, Rep. 6.5% Japan 3.8% 
Thailand 8.1% India 5.5% France 2.1% 
India 4.7% Thailand 4.5% Thailand 1.3% 
France 3.6% France 3.7% Spain 0.9% 
Italy 2.9% Philippines 3.7% Korea, Rep. 0.8% 
Portugal 2.1% Norway 2.2% Italy 0.8% 
Spain 2.0% Pakistan 1.9% Turkey 0.7% 
Germany 1.4% Portugal 1.8% Portugal 0.6% 
      
OECD 78.29% OECD 53.23% OECD 10.99% 
Source:  FAO ForesSTAT data accessed November 2009 
 
This is reflected in the destination of Gabon’s timber exports. China became a 
significant importer of Gabon’s timber in the mid-1990s (Figure 19). In volume, 
Chinese imports of the round-wood equivalent of sawn-wood, veneers and 
plywood is currently more than three times those of French imports (Figure 
19), but in value, China imports roughly the same value of timber products 
from Gabon. The difference between value and volume shares is accounted 
for by the fact that, as will be shown below, the Chinese market is almost 
exclusively a market for unprocessed logs, whereas an increasing (albeit still 
small) share of the EU market is serviced by processed timber products which 
has a higher unit value. Despite being the dominant importer of Gabon’s 
timber by volume, China’s dominance in Gabon’s timber trade is a little 
atypical of the global picture where its share of imports is even higher. The 
high relative share of France in Gabon’s exports reflects its close historical 
links with France and the long presence of French timber companies 
operating in Gabon. 
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Figure 19: Chinese and French Tropical Wood Product Import Structures 
from Gabon – Log and Wood Product Volumes (in 1,000 m3 RWE)* 
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Source: FAO Forestry Trade Flow Data accessed October 2009, http://faostat.fao.org 
* The calculation of the round-wood equivalent uses the following conversion factors, based 
on the responses of firms in Gabon. For EU: the sawn-wood ratio is 2.5:1, for, veneer sheets 
1.82:1, and for plywood 2.3:1. For China: the sawn-wood ratio is 2.05:1 (reflecting lower 
quality requirements of buyers). Veneer sheets and plywood have the same conversion factor 
as in exports to the EU.  
4.2.3. Consequences 
What have been the consequences for Gabon of the shift in the market for its 
timber exports, and what are the implications for the trajectory of its timber 
industry? Two major developments can be noted - the nature and extent of 
standards imposed on producers, and the accretion of value added to 
harvested logs 
 
Standards 
Bluntly-speaking, the transition in market destination has led to a collapse in 
the standards required of producers (Figure 20). These standards have 
important implications for capability-building. Greater demands for quality 
require enhanced skills and the capacity to improve quality over time. Instead, 
Gabonese timber suppliers can basically sell any timber product to China, 
irrespective of the quality of cutting, sawing or finishing, as long as the price is 
low and volumes are large. Environmental standards which influence health 
and safety in the treatment of forest products are an important safeguard for 
the welfare of the workforce. Certification of logs helps to ensure that the 
sustainability of the forests are maintained, and environmental certification 
such as FSC accreditation helps to maintain biodiversity and to promote 
social cohesion. Virtually none of these standards apply to products exported 
to China; virtually all apply to products exported to the EU. 
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Figure 20: Summary of Preferences and Buyer Standards of Chinese 
and EU Buyers of Gabon Timber Products 
 
 Chinese Buyers EU Buyers 
Critical Success Factors in Purchasing Decision 
Stage of processing logs  logs and processed wood 
Species variety wide range, limited 
selection  narrow range, selective 
Quality medium High 
Volume large Small 
Product specifications (eg 
cut specificity) moderate importance  important, intricate 
Price critical critical 
Environmental compliance minor importance important 
Industry-Specific and Public Standards 
Formaldehyde emissions not important important 
Phytosanitary certificate basic entrance criteria important 
Building codes not important moderate importance 
Product testing 
requirements not important moderate importance 
Labour standards not important moderate importance; few 
applications 
Legality certification not required important, OLB dominates 
Sustainability certification not required important, FSC dominates 
green public purchasing minor importance important; few applications 
ISO 14001 not required moderate importance 
 
Value added 
A combination of factors, particularly the growth of its own wood processing 
industries have led to China almost exclusively importing raw logs, In addition, 
China’s low wages and lax environmental regulations mean that it is a direct 
competitor to Gabon’s processing industry in a way which is not true for the 
EU where high wages make for uncompetitive processing in labour intensive 
industries which are often also polluting. Whilst the bulk of Gabon’s timber is 
still exported as raw logs, in recent years Gabonese producers have begun to 
export an increasing volume of sawn-wood, veneers and plywood. This can 
be seen from Figure 21 (which underestimates the value of this shift in export 
composition, since it reflects export volumes rather than export value, - the 
unit price of processed wood is higher than that of unprocessed logs) where it 
is evident that China shows little inclination to import either veneers or 
plywood.  
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Figure 21: Log and Wood Product Demand Distribution for China, 
France and EU-27 Countries - Volume in 1,000 m3 (1997-2006) 
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Source:  AT based on FAO Forest Trade Flows data accessed November 2009 
 
The development impact: factor utilisation 
Since one of the major consequences of a shift in the final market from the EU 
to China is that the degree of processing falls, what are the consequences of 
this for factor utilisation in the Gabonese economy? Table 14 simulates factor 
utilisation if the same quantity of wood is exported in the form of logs, sawn-
wood, veneer sheets and plywood. It calculates the resultant earnings of 
foreign exchange, and the derived utilisation of labour and capital, taking into 
account processing loss in the conversion of logs, as well as the unit-prices in 
global markets in 2006. It is necessarily a crude exercise, but nevertheless, 
the exercise does throw some light on the developmental consequences of 
alternative uses of forest resources, as reflected in different destinations of 
final markets. 
 
It is evident from this that there is a substantial gain in employment to be 
achieved by the downstream processing of logs into sawn-wood, veneer and 
plywood. Employment is more than doubled if the logs are converted into 
sawn-wood, trebled with the extension to producing veneer sheets, and 
quadrupled if these veneer sheets are then incorporated in the production of 
plywood. Foreign exchange earnings are also enhanced with further 
processing, by 25 percent in the case of veneer and 12 percent in the case of 
plywood. However, this is not the case with regard to sawn-wood. Here there 
is a value and foreign exchange loss in processing since the Gabon sawmill 
industry is inefficient and has low conversion rates. Veneer firms also lose 
money in processing. The reason why firms invested in sawmilling and veneer 
production is purely a function of the Forestry Code where firms who were 
unable to afford the high capital entry costs into the production of plywood 
and/or veneer, deepened value added in the expectation of meeting the 2012 
Forestry Code target. These loss-making firms manage to stay in production, 
due to the profits earned through their log exports (Table 14). This 
augmentation of value, employment and foreign exchange earnings through 
processing come at a very considerable cost of capital, particularly in the 
production of plywood and veneer, and comprises a major obstacle for local 
firms in meeting the Forestry Code’s 2012 target.  
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Table 14: Gabon Log Output Channelled into a Single Chain (at Gabon 
Wood Utilisation Rates), Assuming Input of 3,400,000m3 logsa 
 
Logs Sawn-wood Veneer Sheets Plywood 
Output real (‘000m3)b 3,400 1,380 1,870 1,480 
Foreign exchangec 1,188 758 1,480 1,329 
Employment (incl 
employment in earlier stages 
of processing)d 
6,299 16,967 19,389 34,951 
Capital cost ($1,000) e 39,500 43,800 455,000 754,000 
Producer margins (fob value 
minus cost) (indexed to ex-
forest cost of log) 
107 -28 -23 23 
 
Source:  
Notes: a Gabon log production volume rounded average for 2003-2007 
 
b
 Converted using wood utilisation rates in meeting EU buyer requirements 
regarding species and product specifications, i.e. 2.5:1 (EU sawn-wood), 1.82:1 
(veneer sheets) and 2.33:1 (plywood) 
 
3
 Species weighted average using 2006 prices based on (UNCTAD) (Okoumé 
logs, sawn-wood, and plywood), (ITTO, 2009) (average hardwood log prices 
Central African species, own calculations), and (FAOSTAT) (veneer sheets 
export unit price, own calculations)  
 
4
 Own calculations based on fieldwork data collected November 2008–March 
2009 
 
5
 Own calculations based on 2003 capital depreciation costs across chains as 
stated in (Odyssée Développement, 2005) converted into US$ using average 
2003 exchange rate (http://data.un.org); excluding environmental costs such as 
consultancy and certification fees. 
 
Equally concerning from a developmental perspective is the competitiveness 
of Gabonese producers at various points in the timber value chain. It is clear 
that Gabon possesses a significant resource rent in tropical hardwoods in 
general and Okoumé in particular. Table 14 shows that the fob price of a log 
is approximately double that of the cost of extraction, However, at current 
prices, and with current levels of processing efficiency the surplus generated 
in plywood manufacture is much smaller, both as an absolute sum and as a 
proportion of costs. And at current prices, all of the resource rents are 
dissipated – indeed more than dissipated – if logs are sawn or transformed 
and exported as veneer. Thus, the “retrograde” transition from processed to 
raw timber reflected in the shift from the European to the Chinese market may 
arguably be developmentally positive, at least in terms of static comparative 
advantage and at current prices.  
 
But neither of these two conditions are a “given”. With appropriate policy 
support and in competitive markets, it is possible that processing efficiency in 
Gabon’s timber value adding sectors (especially in sawmills) could be 
improved. Moreover, it is also possible that Chinese producers will 
increasingly have to internalise some of the environmental costs which are 
currently not reflected in timber prices and the prices of processed wood 
products. This may lead to an increase in the relative price of sawn-wood, 
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veneer and timber which will enable Gabonese producers to appropriate a 
larger portion of its timber rents in the processing stages of the timber and 
wood products value chain. 
 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
 
To briefly summarise the discussion in earlier sections, we began in Section 1 
by observing that although supply imperatives and capability building are 
critical to the development agenda, less attention has been given to the role 
which demand plays in the evolution of capabilities, particularly in global value 
chains. These demand factors include not just the size and rate of growth of 
demand but also the characteristics of demand. In addition, how producers 
are inserted into different types of markets will also determine the nature and 
the extent of capabilities which are developed. 
 
In Section 2 we reflected on the nature of the post 2008 financial and 
economic crisis and the likely trajectory of the global economy. Even without 
stagnation and falling growth rates in the north, the growth rates of the past 
two decades in China and India are likely to lead to an outcome in which , by 
virtue of their size, they increasingly come to dominate the global economy in 
the 21st century. However, there are persuasive reasons to believe that key 
large northern economies (notably the US, the UK and Spain) will reduce 
imports as they rebalance their global orientation, given their large structural 
trade and fiscal deficits. This will further accentuate the dominance of China, 
India and other low income economies in the growth of global demand in the 
coming decades.  
 
This change in the drivers of global demand – from northern to southern 
economies – will, by hypothesis, have four major sets of implications for 
global value chains in the south (Section 3). This is because of the particular 
characteristics of demand in China and India. First, low levels of per capita 
incomes, coupled with rapid urbanisation and the growth of exchange as their 
economies become more diversified, will lead to a sustained growth in their 
demand for both hard and soft commodities, both as a source of food and as 
inputs into infrastructure. Second, low levels of per capita incomes mean that 
the nature of demand will be for cheap, undifferentiated goods with low 
acquisition cost, running against the major trends in demand in northern 
economies after 1970 which increasingly favoured differentiated, high quality 
positional products. Third, the standards-intensity of global value chains 
feeding into northern economies has grown significantly and has become 
much more complex and demanding in recent decades. By contrast, global 
value chains feeding southern markets are likely to have much levels of 
standards, both in relation to products and processes. And, fourthly, northern 
and southern economies are often complementary in terms of economic 
structures. Northern economies have much high wages costs and are very 
much more sensitive to the harmful externalities of polluting economic 
activities than are southern economies, and have increasingly outsourced 
processing to developing economies. By contrast, low income producing 
countries have similar economic structures and industrial trajectories to low 
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income economy consuming economies, with the prospect of greater 
competition in the division of labour in global value chains. 
 
These hypotheses on the likely outcome for southern economies as the 
demand driver switches from the north to the south were evidenced with 
regard to two global commodity value chains in Section 4. The first of these 
hypotheses concerned the fact that Chinese (and increasingly Indian) demand 
would significantly augment the market for commodities. In both cases this is 
indeed what has happened. In the cassava sector, Chinese demand for food 
and energy has led to a derived demand for cassava, substitute for a rapidly 
declining EU market. In Gabon’s case, northern demand for tropical logs has 
collapsed, whilst Chinese demand has mushroomed. The second of our 
general hypotheses is not as clearly reflected in the cassava sector, but is 
clearly the case in timber. Northern importers are focused on a narrow range 
of species, and buyers are much more demanding on log specifications, 
variety and quality than are Chinese buyers (who basically want large 
volumes at a low price). 
 
The third of our hypotheses was that value chains feeding into a southern 
market are much less likely to be standards-intensive than those feeding into 
northern markets. This is very clearly evidenced in the timber sector, both in 
relation to government-imposed standards focusing on health and safety and 
for civil-society induced standards focusing on the environment. Cassava 
production is less standards-intensive but here, too, there is clear evidence 
that the move from a northern to a southern market leads to a significant 
reduction in the standards-intensity of value chains. 
 
Finally, with regard to the move from a win-win north-south division of labour 
to a win-lose south-south division of labour, we observed similar trends in 
both Thailand’s cassava value chain and Gabon’s timber value chain. The 
change in final market from the EU to China effectively wiped out a key value 
added link in the Thai cassava value chain as Chinese demand for raw chips 
substituted for EU demand for processed pellets. On the other hand, China 
also increased its demand for starch imports from Thailand, starch having a 
higher level of value added than either cassava chips or pellets. However, 
within starch, Chinese firms are seeking to command the higher value added 
and more technologically demanding niches, relegating Thai firms to the 
production of simple native starches. A similar story can be told for Gabon, 
where the Chinese market only demands unprocessed logs, whereas exports 
to the EU have increasingly comprised logs processed into sawn-wood, 
veneers and plywood. This clearly evidences the competitive nature of 
industrial trajectories in southern trading economies which are more likely to 
have win-lose outcomes in specialisation than in the case of win-win trade 
with northern economies. 
 
So what are the wider implications of these findings? First, the growth 
implications are mixed and somewhat analogous to those associated with 
declining barter terms of trade. That is, the unit value added/price of 
commodity exports to China may fall, but augmented demand may increase 
total export incomes. Similarly, the challenge facing commodity exporters 
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forced down the value added chain as Chinese demand grows is similar to 
that faced by developing country exporters in general who specialised in static 
dynamic comparative advantage. In this case, incomes may grow, but at the 
cost of falling capabilities. Chinese demand appears to force both the Thai 
cassava and the Gabon timber sector into low technology, low skill niches in 
their chains. This is reinforced by the lower requirement for standards in these 
value chains. Although standards also have their negative side – see below – 
they are promoting of managerial and skill competences in production. 
Another positive consequence of standards in production is that they most 
often reflect the need to compensate for non-price externalities arising in 
production (for example, the loss of biodiversity) rather than just embodying 
ethical concerns (for example, in relation to minimum wages or child labour).  
 
A further negative consequence of trade with China, India and other southern 
economies is that insofar as it involves lower degrees of value added, there 
will be a loss in employment and, in some cases, in investment surpluses.  
 
On the other hand, the substitution of a southern for a northern driver of 
demand has many advantages for low income countries and for participants in 
their value chains. Particularly in the context of sustained economic crisis in 
the north, it provides a dynamic and particularly rapid source of demand, 
allowing exporting economies and firms to reap scale economies and to 
reduce their costs. And, insofar as their previous trajectory may have been 
costly (as is arguably the case in Gabon’s timber industry where industrial 
ambitions may be forcing the country to waste its resource rents in inefficient 
processing), being forced back into comparative advantage through trade with 
China and other southern economies may provide unintended benefits. 
Further,. It is not axiomatic that all standards are developmentally beneficial in 
the context oof low per capita incomes. The trade-offs in terms of lost 
employment and value added may be too high, for example, to justify the 
higher safety standards driving much legislation in the north or indeed to meet 
the ethical concerns of northern civil society. Finally, there will be complex 
and differentiated implications for different participants in southern value 
chains. For example, small firms and farmers who are currently largely 
excluded from participating in global value chains by the need to encompass 
high standards in their production for northern markets, may now find that 
these barriers to entry are removed.  
 
… 
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